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Whistle Blowing as a Rule 10b-5 Violation:
Dirks v. SEC
A diligent securities analyst who in the normal course of his
work ferrets out evidence of fraudulent activity within a corporation may not disseminate such information to his clients, despite

his numerous attempts to have regulatory agencies and the Wall
Street Journaldisclose the news of the corporate corruption to the
general public. Rather, he must refrain from advising his clients to
sell their stock until it loses most or all of its value.
This remarkable rule of law is currently being urged by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, albeit in a more ingenuous
formulation, upon the United States Supreme Court in Dirks v.
SEC.' If the Supreme Court adopts this position, it will represent a
complete departure from the prevailing law of liability for insider
trading under rule 10b-5 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'

I.

THE FACTUAL SETTING OF

Dirks

On March 7, 1973, Raymond Dirks, a highly regarded analyst
of insurance company securities, was contacted by a former executive of the Equity Funding Corporation of America ("Equity Fund1. 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'g [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 82,812
(SEC Jan. 22, 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Rule 10b-5 provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of any material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
3. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered
any manipulation or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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ing"), an insurance holding company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. The executive told Dirks an incredible story of massive
fraud involving, among other things, the creation and booking of
fictitious insurance policies by Equity Funding. The informant
had also approached a New York State regulatory agency earlier
that day to report his knowledge of the alleged fraud.' The executive did not contact the SEC, assuming that such an approach
would be fruitless because of the Commission's failure to investigate several earlier complaints by Equity Funding employees regarding the allegedly fraudulent practices.
When the informant departed after his three-and-a-half hour
recital of the allegedly criminal practices at Equity Funding, 8
Dirks decided to investigate. After his initial inquiries directed to
members of the Wall Street investment community failed to elicit
any explanation of the alleged fraud, Dirks flew to Los Angeles,
where he interviewed some members of the senior management of
Equity Funding and additional former employees during the week
of March 19, 1973. Despite the denial by Equity Funding management of any wrongdoing and the purported ignorance of its auditors, Dirks obtained substantial corroboration of the initial allegations from former Equity Funding employees." Between March 21
and 24, Dirks repeatedly tried to persuade the Wall Street Journal
to print a story about the alleged Equity Funding fraud. The Los
Angeles bureau chief refused to publish such a story because he
thought that the publication of the former employee's hearsay evidence would be libelous. The bureau chief urged Dirks, however, to
brief the SEC on the allegations. 0 Dirks contacted the SEC on
March 27 and spent two days presenting his information to the
Commission."
Throughout his three-week investigation, Dirks contacted a
number of Wall Street analysts and investors to substantiate ru4. 681 F.2d at 829.
5. Id. at 829-31.

6. The former executive met with the New York Insurance Department and alleged
that false, nonexistent insurance policies on the books of Equity Funding were being sold to
reinsurers. Dirks was not aware of this communication for nearly two weeks, well after he

began investigating the fraud. Id. at 832 n.6.
7. Id.
8. See In re Boston Co. Institutional Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 81,705, at 80,838 (SEC, Sept. 1, 1978).

9. 681 F.2d at 830-31.
10. Id. at 831-32; In re Boston Co. Institutional Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
11. 681 F.2d at 832.

81,705, at 80,844-45 (SEC Sept. 1, 1978).
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mors, to provide information to clients or potential clients, and to
respond to others inquiring about the possible fraud. Five of the
investment advisors contacted by Dirks liquidated their holdings
in Equity Funding, while other investors purchased stock or maintained their positions.' Within little more than two weeks after
the securities analyst began his investigation, the price of Equity
Funding stock fell by almost half its pre-investigation market
price. The New York Stock Exchange halted trading in Equity
Funding stock on March 27, 1973. The following day, the SEC followed suit and suspended trading in the stock for a ten-day period.18 Within a few days, a state insurance regulatory authority,
alerted by the New York agency to which Dirks's initial informant
had first spoken, uncovered evidence of asset manipulation in Illinois.14 The Wall Street Journal finally published a story concerning the scandal, which earned the author a nomination for a PulitThree days later, Equity Funding filed for
zer Prize.'
bankruptcy.' 6 After public revelation of the fraudulent scheme,
twenty-two Equity Funding 7defendants were ultimately convicted
on various criminal charges.'
The Division of Enforcement of the SEC charged Dirks with
violating rule 10b-5 and aiding and abetting violations of section
10(b), rule 10b-5, and section 17(a)' 8 of the federal securities laws
because he had repeated the allegations of fraud to the five institu12. Id. at 831 & n.4.
13. Id. at 832.
14. The New York State Insurance Commission informed the California Insurance Department of the former executive's allegations because the California agency had jurisdiction over Equity Funding. The California insurance authority then contacted the Illinois
Insurance Department, which uncovered the first hard evidence of fraud. Id. at 832 n.6.
15. Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds: Some Assets Missing, Insurance Called Bogus At
Equity Funding Life, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
16. 681 F.2d at 832.
17. Wright, 22 Indicted by U.S. in Equity Scandal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1973, at 1,
col. 1.
18. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
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tional investors who liquidated their Equity Funding holdings
before public disclosure of the fraud. 19 The administrative law
judge found that Dirks had violated the federal securities laws as
alleged by the Division of Enforcement and suspended him from
associating with any broker or dealer for sixty days.2 ° On review,
the Commission affirmed the administrative finding that the secur2
ities analyst was a tippee of confidential corporate information 1
who had aided and abetted violations of the federal securities laws
by his investor clients.2 In view of the significant contribution
made by the securities analyst to the discovery of the fraud and his
attempts to effect public disclosure, the SEC reduced the sanction
to a censure.2
II. THE TIPPEE'S DISCLOSE-OR-REFRAIN DUTY
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC decision.2 ' The court held that Dirks aided and abetted his clients' violations of rule 10b-5 when he informed them of the alleged fraud
without disclosing such knowledge to the public and the SEC.2
Writing for the court, Judge Wright conceded that Dirks was responsible for exposing "one of the most infamous frauds in recent
memory," which "the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate. '' 26 The court rejected Dirks's contention that he had no
fiduciary obligation to uninformed shareholders to keep his knowledge of the fraud to himself. Judge Wright recognized that the
fiduciary framework of Chiarella v. United States 7 imposed'a disclose-or-refrain duty only on those parties bound by relationships
19. In re Boston Co. Institutional Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,705 (SEC Sept. 1, 1978).
20. Id. at 80,846-67. Four of the five investors who sold Equity Funding stock after
learning of the fraud from Dirks were also found to have violated the securities laws.
21. Id. at 83,947-49.
22. In re Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 82,812 (Jan. 22, 1981), a/'d, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
371 (1982). The investors censured in the administrative proceeding did not seek review of
the administrative law judge's initial decision. The Commission only addressed the liability
of Dirks for aiding and abetting the various violations of his investor clients. Implicitly rejected was the administrative finding that the securities analyst directly violated rule 10b-5.
23. Id. at 83,950-51.
24. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aft'g [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 82,812 (SEC Jan. 22, 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
25. 681 F.2d at 837-42, 844-46.
26. Id. at 829.
27. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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of trust or confidence to potentially injured shareholders.2 8 Judge
Wright maintained that Dirks inherited such a duty when he received information about the possible fraud, even though under
California corporation law his informants breached no confidential
duty to the corporation or its shareholders by disclosing their allegations of corporate corruption.2 Stating that the state law of
fiduciary relations was not coextensive with the duty to disclose
under rule 10b-5, Judge Wright reasoned that Chiarella merely required the existence of fiduciary obligations, not the breach
thereof;30 Dirks's informants, in Judge Wright's view, could not legally have traded on their knowledge of fraud because they
remained fiduciaries of Equity Funding and its shareholders.ai
Therefore, reasoned Judge Wright, the securities analyst and his
investor clients had a duty not to profit as tippees of the information, even though they received the information lawfully.2 Despite
his explicit acknowledgment of Dirks's various attempts to effect
public disclosure and the securities analyst's critical role in uncovering the massive fraud, Judge Wright concluded that the securities analyst aided and abetted violations of rule 10b-5 by disseminating the allegations of fraud to investors likely to trade on the
information. 3
III.

THE FIDUCIARY RATIONALE BEFORE

Dirks

The circumstances in which an individual possessing material
nonpublic information is deemed an insider subject to the disclosure requirement of rule 10b-5 have evoked considerable debate."
28. 681 F.2d at 837.
29. Id. at 838-39.
30. Id. at 837-38.
31. Id. at 839. The opinion assumed that Dirks's informants retained a fiduciary obligation not to trade on their knowledge of the fraud even though their dissemination of the
information to Dirks was lawful. The question whether secret trading by the corporate insiders themselves would have been illegal remains unresolved. See id. at 838 n.15.
32. See id. at 838-39.
33. Id. at 842, 844-46. Judge Wright advanced an alternative theory of liability by finding that Dirks had an ethical duty to disclose that was "implicit in the scheme of brokerdealer registration under the federal securities laws ... even if we would not impose it on
his sources at Equity Funding." Id. at 840. The doctrinal support for the broker-dealer
registration laws as a source of a duty not to disclose seems questionable. The theory is
unlikely to receive serious consideration by the Supreme Court because the SEC never
pressed this argument throughout the proceedings.
34. See Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1308 (1981); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An
Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
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Although rule 10b-5 has its origins in the fiduciary principles embedded in common law fraud and state corporation codes, the
scope of the duty to disclose has been broadened to include persons other than corporate directors, executives, and controlling
shareholders." This development is attributable principally to the
SEC's grafting of the goal of equalizing the availability of market
information onto the twin legislative objectives of the federal securities laws: promoting investor confidence and the efficient functioning of capital markets."'
In the landmark case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 37 the SEC
interpreted rule 10b-5 as prohibiting corporate insiders from trading on inside information without public disclosure. The Commission set forth two rationales for the disclose-or-refrain rule: (1)
Corporate insiders have access to information intended to be used
only for corporate purposes and not for personal benefit, and (2)
the use by insiders of legally unavailable information is inherently
unfair to investors without access to such information. 8 Cady,
Roberts involved an individual who was both a director of a corporation and a partner in a brokerage firm and who used undisclosed
corporate information to benefit the brokerage firm's clients. The
director-broker could have been held liable under rule 10b-5 on the
narrower ground of a breach of fiduciary duty. The language of the
SEC decision, however, supported a broader interpretation of rule
10b-5 under a fairness rationale.3 9 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,40 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
employing a rationale similar to that of the Commission in Cady,
Roberts, held that various corporate insiders had violated rule 10b5 by trading on news certain to increase the worth of company
stock when publicly disclosed. The Second Circuit found the harm
to uninformed investors to be the inherent unfairness of the defendants' informational advantage. It did not condition the shareholders' right to information solely on the insiders' fiduciary ties to the
798 (1973); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1982); see also Morgan, The Insider Trading Rules After
Chiarella: Are They Consistent with Statutory Policy?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1407 (1982).
35. For a summary of the relationship between common law doctrines of fiduciary responsibility and the development of the law under rule 10b-5, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1445-56 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3556-72 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
36. See generally Brudney, supra note 34, at 333-39.
37. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

38. Id. at 912.
39. See id.
40. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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corporation and its shareholders.41
Consistent with its expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5, the
4
Commission determined in In re Investors Management, Inc. 2
that tippees of corporate insiders were also subject to rule 10b-5. 4 9
Although unrelated by any relationship of trust to the corporation
or its shareholders, the Commission considered the tippee to have
inherited a duty to disclose or refrain from trading on confidential
corporate information that the tippee should have known was improperly obtained. Because the nontrading informant could not
lawfully profit from the information, his 44
tippee was similarly prohibited from trading on the insider's tip.

In most cases, the dissemination of corporate information by
an insider to a tippee is an actual breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty to the corporation or its shareholders. In some cases, however,
tippee liability has been thought to result even when the communication of confidential information by a corporate insider is legitimate. The rationale for this variant theory of tippee liability is
that the mere receipt of corporate confidential information imposes on the tippee a constructive fiduciary duty not to trade on
the information without public disclosure. The validity of this alternative theory of tippee liability is open to doubt given the
fiduciary principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Chiarella.5
In Chiarella the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
rule 10b-5 was violated merely because a person obtained information not legally available to other diligent investors. The Court restricted the scope of rule 10b-5 to those persons owing fiduciary
obligations to the corporation or its shareholders. The mere possession of nonpublic material market information, in the absence of
any special relationship of trust or confidence, did not trigger a
duty to disclose or refrain from trading on the information. 46
Chiarella has had significant implications for all kinds of informational exchanges.47 Any allegation of insider status or rule
41. See id. at 848.
42. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
43. The Second Circuit adopted the concept of tippee liability in Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Shapiro involved a civil action
for damages brought by uninformed purchasers of stock.
44. 44 S.E.C. at 645-46.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 79-88.
46. 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980).
47. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1981); Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Lund, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
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10b-5 violations must be framed in terms of the fiduciary principle
adopted by the Court in that case. Given the various concurring
and dissenting opinions filed by the Justices, the parameters of the
decision are unclear. 8 Subsequent lower court decisions, however,
have consistently interpreted Chiarella as predicating liability for
insider trading on the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the trader and the corporation from which the information was
originally obtained.49
By restricting the scope of the disclose-or-refrain rule to parties bound by fiduciary relationships, the majority in Chiarella
clouded5" the precise cirumstances in which tippee communications result in liability for insider trading under rule 10b-5. 8 Writing for the Court in Chiarella, Justice Powell seemed to tolerate
the inherent tension between the fiduciary rationale for the prohibition on insider trading and the disclosure duty of the tippee, unrelated to the corporation. In a footnote, Justice Powell alluded to
a justification for tippee liability within the fiduciary framework by
viewing a tippee "as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty.""3 Dirks squarely presents the question
of tippee liability within the fiduciary structure of Chiarella for
review by the Supreme Court. 3 .
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) V 98,428 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,443 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1981); SEC v. Finamerica Corp., SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 594, at A-5
(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1981); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 492 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd,
679 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1982).
The decision in Chiarella has also received a great deal of scholarly comment. See, e.g.,
Cann, A Duty to Disclose? An Analysis of Chiarella v. United States, 85 DICK. L. REV. 249
(1981); Deutsch, Chiarella v. United States: A Study in Legal Style, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1291
(1980); Langevoort, supra note 34; Morgan, supra note 34; Wang, Trading on National
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981); Note, The Trend Toward a Strict
Construction of Rule lOb-5: Aaron v. S.E.C. and Chiarella v. United States, 13 CONN. L.
REV. 549 (1981); see also Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus
Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Morrison, Silence Is Golden: Trading on NonPublic Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211 (1980).
48. See Barry, supra note 34, at 1313-14; Langevoort, supra note 34, at 17.
49. See cases cited supra note 47.
50. Under the misappropriation theory articulated by Chief Justice Burger, it would be
more difficult to assert that Dirks was a tippee because he did not receive stolen information. Cf. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
51. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 28-30.
52. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
53. The case evoked considerable comment at the agency and appellate levels. See, e.g.,
Heller, supra note 47; Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information and the Regulators, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1973); Langevoort, supra note 34. The proceedings attained new significance when the Supreme Court granted Dirks's petition for certiorari, 103 S.Ct. 371 (1982),
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Given the precedent discussed above, the District of Columbia
Circuit's conclusion that Dirks had violated rule 10b-5 required
one of two findings: (1) Dirks was a corporate insider; or (2) if not
a corporate insider or one standing in some fiduciary relationship
to the corporation or its shareholders, Dirks inherited a duty to the
corporation as a tippee of corporate information. To be liable as a
tippee under existing law, he must have acquired confidential corporate information from a corporate insider, directly or indirectly,
and he must have known or reasonably should have known that
the information was improperly obtained. The courts disagree on
whether the initial informant must have actually breached a fiduciary obligation by disclosing the information to the tippee.", In the
absence of any fiduciary duty not to disclose on the part of Dirks's
informants, Dirks could not be deemed to have inherited, as a tippee, his informants' duty not to trade on their knowledge of the
fraud.
Judge Wright's conclusion that Dirks became a tippee upon
being told of the possible fraud55 is flawed by the initial assumption that the analyst received inside information. Dirks never inherited a duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 because the allegations
of fraud did not constitute inside information. California law exempted the informants from a breach of confidentiality, a fact that
the SEC had conceded in the initial proceedings." More important, as evidence of a crime, the allegations of possible fraud were
not a corporate asset subject to misappropriation or wrongful withholding under agency or restitution principles.5 7 Since the informaand the Department of Justice endorsed the position of the securities analyst rather than

that of the Commission.
The SEC was authorized to file a brief in opposition to Dirks's petition for certiorari,
but the Solicitor General stated that in his view the opinion of the court of appeals conflicted with all five opinions-majority, concurring, and dissenting-in Chiare~la. Brief of
the SEC in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct.
371 (1982). The Court heard oral argument in the case on Mar. 21, 1983. Court Hears Whistle-Blower Case, The Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1983, at C7-C12; Greenhouse, Dirks Gets His
Day in Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1983 at D1, col. 3; Ray Dirks Gets His Day in Court,
Bus. WK., Mar. 21, 1983, at 130.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86.
55. 681 F.2d at 838 & n.15.

56. In re Dirks, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,812, at 83,948 (SEC Jan. 22, 1981), affd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
57. All the previous cases finding tippee liability for violation of rule lOb-5 involved the
dissemination for a noncorporate purpose of confidential information in which the corporation had a property right. By contrast, in Dirks information about fraud was criminal evidence, which could not be deemed the private property of Equity Funding or its corporate
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tion conveyed by Dirks's informants failed to render the securities
analyst a tippee, there was no source from which he could have
inherited a fiduciary duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. Thus,
the majority's conclusion that Dirks inherited his informants' duty
to refrain from trading is wrong because it is premised on the incorrect assumption that Dirks was a tippee.
Judge Wright recognized that Chiarella required as a
threshold finding that Dirks somehow inherited a fiduciary duty as
a tippee since Dirks was not related in any way to Equity Funding's shareholders. Conceding that Chiarella did not sanction imposing liability on persons simply because they possessed informational advantages over other investors, the court struggled to find
another source of the informants' duty for which Dirks was the
conduit. Judge Wright's response was to assert that Chiarella did
not require a breach of a fiduciary obligation but merely the existence of some fiduciary relationship.58 Moreover, stated Judge
Wright, the fiduciary duties of Dirks's informants were not coex59
tensive with those imposed by state fiduciary law.
Judge Wright's alleged distinction between the fiduciary duty
itself and the breach of such duty is specious and constitutes no
0 when considbasis for tippee liability. The language of Chiarella,6
ered in the context of insider trading, necessarily implies that the
use of inside information must constitute a breach of a fiduciary
obligation to shareholders before rule 10b-5 will apply. A person
obliged to act for the benefit of shareholders breaches a fiduciary
duty to them when he trades on inside information without making public disclosure. In its brief discussion of tippee liability,6 the
Court in Chiarella suggested that an inside informant must have
breached his duty by selectively disclosing the information to the
tippee. Other federal courts that have interpreted Chiarella
insiders. Under agency principles, Dirks's informant was entitled to disseminate the allegations to the analyst. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment f (1958). Analysis in terms of agency doctrine seems appropriate, given the fiduciary framework with which
the Chiarella Court placed rule lob-5 issues.
58. "The Chiarellamajority focused on the existence of a set of fiduciary obligations as
a prerequisite to the addition of a disclosure-or-refrain duty, but it did not hold that breach
of the fiduciary obligations was required to bring Rule lOb-5 to bear on a case .
681
F.2d at 838 (emphasis in original).
59. "While the standards of Rule 10b-5 have always duplicated state fiduciary obliga-

tions to a certain extent, courts have never regarded the two as identical." Id.
60. "[A] purchaser of stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is
neither an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to reveal material
facts." 445 U.S. at 229.

61. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
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broadly have done so only when the facts revealed a breach of a
fiduciary obligation by the party charged with a rule 10b-5
violation.62
The precedents marshalled by Judge Wright in support of his
assertion that the fiduciary duties of Dirks's informants need not
parallel state fiduciary law provide no support at all. Several of the
cited cases concerned outsiders who were fiduciaries of the injured
investors by reason of preexisting relationships of trust or as a result of conduct that induced trust. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,e3 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States," Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,65 and Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,66
undisclosed trading by investment advisors, market makers, and
financial columnists, who were unrelated to the firms in whose
stock they traded for their personal benefit, constituted deceptive
practices banned by rule 10b-5. Such persons were fiduciaries of
the shareholders, and their undisclosed trading violated their duty
to provide disinterested financial advice. This basis for a duty to
disclose has no analogue in Dirks's case, since the shareholders injured by the Equity Funding scandal were never clients of Dirks as
an investment advisor. Furthermore, neither the analyst nor his
67
firm owned any Equity Funding shares at any time.
Most of the decisions cited by Judge Wright that did involve
corporate insiders did not concern the application of rule 10b-5 as
an enforcement mechanism against insider trading. In Goldberg v.
Meridor," the shareholders of a subsidiary firm invoked rule 10b-5
as a disclosure mechanism in a derivative action to supplement a
state cause of action against the directors 'of the parent corporation
for unfair valuation of assets. The Second Circuit in Meridor did
not interpret rule 10b-5 as creating a fiduciary obligation or as
mandating disclosure of information in the absence of a fiduciary
duty. Staffin v. Greenberg,"9 which involved the purchase of stock
by an outsider contemplating a corporate merger, merely restated
the Chiarellarule that a party unrelated to the target corporation,
62. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); O'Connor & Assocs.
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.

SEC.

98,443 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1981).
63. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
64. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
65. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
66. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
67. Greenhouse, supra note 53, at D2, col. 2.
68. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
69. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1981).

L.

REP.

(CCH) V
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whether as an insider, fiduciary, or tippee, need not disclose his
reason for purchasing the corporation's stock. 0 In United States v.
Newman," the Second Circuit held former employees of an investment bank and a stockbroker liable for violating rule 10b-5 by
stealing and then trading on information entrusted to the bank by
its corporate clients. As agents of the employer bank, the employees breached their fiduciary obligation not to disseminate confidential information that the bank had received by virtue of its special
trust relationship with its corporate clients. 2
Judge Wright failed to establish that Dirks's informants were
legally required, by virtue of some duty independent of state corporation law, to withhold the allegations of fraud. As a result,
Dirks did not inherit a duty to refrain from disseminating the nonconfidential allegations. The SEC failed to establish the threshold
requirement under Chiarella: that the securities analyst had a
fiduciary duty to disclose to the public the Equity Funding fraud
before advising his clients of the allegations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reverse the judgment below that Dirks aided
and abetted violations of the federal securities laws.
IV.

THE

Dirks VARIATION-LIABILITY

WITHOUT A BREACH OF

DUTY

Judge Wright's opinion highlights the current uncertainty in
the federal courts regarding the circumstances in which a tippee
who legitimately received confidential information has a duty
under rule 10b-5 to disclose the information or refrain from trading.78 Since Dirks should turn on the threshold issue of whether
Dirks's receipt of information about the fraud subjected him to
tippee liablity, 4 the application of the fiduciary principle adopted
in ChiareUa to the theory of tippee liability may remain unresolved. If, however, the Supreme Court regards the information
received by the securities analyst as confidential inside information
disseminated to him by legitimate means, affirmance of the court
of appeals. would require the Supreme Court to adopt a constructive breach theory of tippee liability-thereby nullifying the re70. Id. at 1202.
71. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 17, 19.
73. Compare SEC v. Lund, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,428 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982) with Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1980).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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quirement of a special relationship of trust or confidence between a
corporation and a tippee.
Although the theory of tippee liability is necessary to prevent
insiders from avoiding rule 10b-5 liability by trading secretly in
concert with outsiders, such a theory is conceptually at odds with
the Chiarella fiduciary principle. 75 This tension is reduced by
viewing the tippee as a participant after the fact in his informant's
breach of duty, assuming that the tipper's communication with the
tippee in fact constituted a breach of some duty not to disclose the
particular information. The court in Dirks instead adopted a conwas
structive breach theory of tippee liability under which Dirks
7a
shareholders.
Funding's
Equity
of
deemed a quasi-fiduciary
The constructive breach theory is derived from restitution and
trust law principles of unjust enrichment and has been approved
by only one federal court of appeals, the District of Columbia Circuit in Dirks.77 The Second Circuit has explicitly rejected the constructive breach theory. 78 The precedent for such a theory is particularly dubious in light of Chiarella.The seminal tippee liability
decisions, Investors Management7 9 and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith,s0 involved persons who acquired confidential information as a result of an insider's breach of his fiduciary duty. These cases do not provide adequate support for the constructive breach theory. Although the requirement of an actual
breach is not specified, there was no reason for the SEC to have
done so. In both decisions, tippees received confidential information from a corporate insider. The majority opinion in Investors
Management articulated a test that, loosely stated, can certainly
be read to require an actual breach by the tipper.8 1 Investors Management requires that the tippee's information be improperly obtained and "emanate" from a corporate source.8 2 The concurring
opinion urged more specifically the requirement that tippee liabil75. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 28-32.
76. The court implicitly adopted this theory by rejecting the actual breach requirement
and relying on general trust doctrines as well as authorities supporting a constructive breach
theory of tippee liability. See 681 F.2d at 839 & n.16.
77. The D.C. Circuit in Dirks joined a California federal district court that had adopted
a constructive breach theory in SEC v. Lund, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,428 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982).
78. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
79. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
80. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
81. See Fleischer, supra note 34, at 806-07.
82. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 644.
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ity hinge on the corporate insider's breach of duty.8 3 Because Justice Powell's explanation in Chiarella of tippee liability tracks the
language of the Investors Management concurring opinion more
nearly than it follows the majority opinion in Investors Management or the Second Circuit decision in Shapiro," Judge Wright's
dismissal of Chiarella as support for the actual breach theory of
tippee liability is ingenuous.
After Chiarella the continued validity of the constructive
breach theory of rule 10b-5 liability is questionable because that
theory replaces the Chiarella requirement of a preexisting fiduciary relationship with a concept of liability based on the tippee's
relative informational advantage in an arm's-length context.8 5
Under the constructive breach theory, the receipt of confidential
information renders the recipient the shareholders' constructive
trustee, who may not profit from the information despite the absence of a relationship between the tippee and the shareholders or
any wrongdoing on the informant's part. The Court in Chiarella
refused to transform the informational advantage gained by the
mere receipt of information in a legitimate manner into a duty to
disclose or refrain from trading on the information."" The constructive breach theory thus undermines the Supreme Court's rejection
of the use of rule 10b-5 as a "parity-of-information" '7 tool.
83. Commissioner Smith stated,
It is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they
do, which I think appropriate, rather than on policing information per se and its
possession, which I think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in the law should
continue to be upon the conduct of corporate insiders and their privies ...
rather than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any consistency-of
relative informational advantages in the marketplace.
[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a
necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in
breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to
disclose the information ....
Id. at 651 (Smith, Comm'r, concurring).
84. Investors Management and Shapiro arose from the same occurrence in which a
financial analyst with Merrill Lynch, the prospective managing underwriter for Douglas Aircraft Company, tipped investor clients as to an as-yet unannounced reduction in Douglas's
earnings. The Second Circuit adopted the broader view of the SEC majority opinion in Investors Management.
85. The constructive breach theory may be viewed as an attempt to achieve the policy
goals of the "information" theory while employing the "fiduciary" language of Chiarella.Cf.
Dirks, 681 F.2d at 835 n.4 (discussing inherent tension between the two theories).
86. See 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
87. See id. at 233.
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V.

THE DETECTION OF SECURITIES FRAUD AFTER

Dirks

From a policy standpoint, the Dirks decision adversely affects
investor confidence and the efficient allocation of capital. The result in Dirks would inhibit informational exchanges between securities analysts and corporate sources, thus diminishing the ability of
investors to make informed decisions based on investment advice.
Investors would then be forced to rely solely on the investigative
efforts of the SEC for detection of fraudulent securities transactions. The proceedings against Dirks highlight the dangers inherent in relying on the SEC to uncover securities fraud and illustrate
the critical role of private initiative as a supplement to federal
criminal investigation. Dirks raises the question of how best to investigate massive, skillfully orchestrated fraud at the smallest social cost and with the least unfairness to uninformed shareholders.
The social costs of large-scale securities fraud are substantial,
whether measured against the risk of a libel suit following publication of allegations of possible fraud, increased budgetary allocations to state and federal enforcement agencies, or the expense of
private investigations by unremunerated parties. The cost of permitting private individuals, such as the securities analyst in Dirks,
to disseminate the results of their investigations of large-scale
fraud undiscovered by the SEC is justified by the benefit to society
of early detection of the fraud.
Another goal of the securities laws, of course, is the promotion
of fairness in securities transactions. This objective is not disserved
by allowing private individuals to profit from their efforts at uncovering fraud by disseminating the information as investment advice. First, the speed with which the information is disseminated
permits securities to reach their true market value quickly, avoiding unnecessary outlays of funds by uninformed investors."8 Second, the large institutional investors that benefit from professional
investment advice indirectly represent the pooled interests of millions of small investors holding stock in mutual funds, pension
plans, or insurance companies. To the extent that uninformed individual investors with small holdings invest in the same companies as do their informed investment or portfolio managers, they
are not harmed by the absence of public disclosure. In this circumstance, the windfall gain of the institutional investor passes indirectly to the individual investor who does not personally receive
88. This assumes the validity of some form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.
For a discussion of the variants of this theory, see Barry, supra note 34, at 1330-59.
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the advice of a securities analyst. This proposition is difficult to
establish as a justification for future private investigations such as
the one in Dirks. This rationale is, however, appropriate in view of
the current market, which is dominated by a few large institutional
investors.8 9
Dirks illustrates several ways in which a rule encouraging extragovernmental investigation of securities fraud would foster investor confidence. First, the securities analyst uncovered the fraudulent scheme much sooner than did the SEC.9 0 Second, Dirks's
efforts led eventually to the public revelation of the scandal and
the conviction and punishment of the criminals at Equity Funding.9 ' In terms of social gain, Dirks's discovery of the fraud fulfilled
the goal of punishing miscreants who waste scarce resources by
causing uninformed investors to buy worthless securities. It is also
conceivable that similar investigations, motivated by the prospect
of financial gain, will deter those who might otherwise concoct
schemes such as the Equity Funding fraud. The result should be
fewer frauds, or at least more rapid detection. Removing the
financial incentive to private individuals to investigate securities
fraud would discourage persons from undertaking costly private investigations. This would undermine significantly the federal criminal enforcement effort against securities fraud.
The censure of Dirks deals a serious blow to the right of investors to substitute insurance, in the form of professional investment
advice, for the risk of making uninformed investment decisions.92
The right to insure against such risks is inherent in our legal system, which gives property owners the right to protect their interests from injury caused by wasteful behavior as well as from loss
caused by property destruction or theft. Seeking professional securities advice is analogous to using private security guards as a
supplement to state and federal police; it provides information to
investors who wish to avoid quantifiable, probable losses and
wasteful use of their resources. Until Dirks, not even the SEC has
argued that securities analysts, or their clients who pay for the
analysts' expert advice, must disclose lawfully acquired information to other investors who are unable or unwilling to pay for the
89. Id. at 1309 n.9.
90. See 681 F.2d at 832 n.6.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
92. The individual purchase of privately produced securities information is often justified by the significant social benefit the information provides. See, e.g., Barry, supra note
34, at 1323-28.
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advice."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Dirks is
incorrect because Dirks neither owed nor breached a fiduciary duty
to Equity Funding or its shareholders. Chiarellasuggests that even
if Dirks did inherit a duty a's a tippee, he still should not have been
found liable under rule 10b-5, since no wrongdoing by Dirks's informants was effected in connection with his receipt of the
information.
Although the securities analyst in Dirks attempted to effect
public disclosure, he violated no duty in relating the information to
his own clients before the general public learned of the fraud.
Dirks had no relationship of trust or confidence with Equity Funding shareholders, no duty to them, and never received confidential
inside information. Whistle-blowing is a necessary function of securities analysts, permitting the rapid valuation of securities and
supplementing the woefully inadequate regulation of securities
fraud by federal enforcement agencies. 4
WENDY EHRENKRANZ

93. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also Brudney, supra
note 34, at 361-62.
94. For a discussion of the history of SEC enforcement actions, see J. SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION: THE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND CORPORATE FINANCE

(1981).

Editor's NoteOn July 1, 1983, during the printing of this issue, the United States Supreme Court
held that Raymond Dirks "had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that
he obtainled." Dirks v. SEC, 51 U.S.L.W. 5123, 5129 (U.S. July 1, 1983) (No. 82-276). The
Court reasoned, as did the author of this casenote, that
Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no preexisting fiduciary
duty to its shareholders. He took no action, directly or indirectly, that induced
the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in

him. There was no expectation by Dirk's [sic] sources that he would keep their
information in confidence.
Id. at 5128.

